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　本稿では，リソース PKIから発行されるリソース証明書を用いて BGP FlowSpecの抱え
る問題を解決し，DNSリフレクション攻撃に対する BGP FlowSpecの有用性を評価する．
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Abstract
Measures against DNS reection attack
using BGP FlowSpec
In recent years, many DNS reection attacks have been made to make services of a
specic host such as a server down, using a lot of computers on the network as stepping
staircases. DNS (Domain Name Server) reection attack is a type of DDoS (Distributed
Denial of Service) attack, abusing a DNS server that is managed with little management
and transmitting a large number of packets simultaneously, Causing a great burden on
the vehicle. The host that is the target of attack can not process the large amount of
data transmitted and falls into a state in which the original service can not be provided.
As a countermeasure against DNS reection attacks, the BGP router has a function
called FlowSpec. FlowSpec is a function to notify the remote router to start packet
ltering. However, this function has problems such as having no means for checking
forged messages.
In this paper, we solve the problem of BGP FlowSpec by using resource certicate issued
from resource PKI and evaluate the usefulness of BGP FlowSpec against DNS reection
attack.
key words DNS reection attack，BGP FlowSpec，Resource PKI
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ンターネットでは，この BGP を扱うルータが相互に接続されることで IP パケットが届
く世界規模のネットワークとして形作られている．BGP ルータは ISP(Internet Service
Provider)等に設置され，IPアドレスや経路情報を BGPルータ同士が交換することで，隣
接していない IPネットワークに対してパケットの転送ができるようになっている．
　経路制御プロトコルは，EGP(Exterior Gateway Protovol) と IGP(Interior Gateway
Protocol) の二つに大きく分けることができる．IGP は，組織の内部で完結する経路制御














BGPを用いた経路制御では，上位の ISPや IX(Internet Exchange)への接続と AS番号













































ガー BGPルータに通知を行う．通知を受けたトリガー BGPルータは，上位 ISPの BGP
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